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Abstract 
 
A proposal has been made to build a new tunnel under the Scheldt river near the centre of Antwerp in 
order to relieve traffic congestion on the ring road and in an existing tunnel. The new tunnel is expected 
to cost more than €1 billion, and tolls have been suggested to help finance construction and to manage 
demand. This paper conducts a preliminary cost-benefit analysis of a new tunnel and three alternative 
tolling schemes, and compares them with a do-nothing scenario and an option to toll the existing tunnel 
without building a new one. The two tunnels are treated as imperfect substitutes, and a multi-year 
accounting framework is adopted that accounts for emissions, accidents and noise externalities, road 
damage, revenues accruing to the national and regional governments from existing transport user charges, 
and the salvage value of the new tunnel. With the base-case parameter values it is found that building the 
tunnel is worthwhile with all three tolling regimes and yields a higher benefit than not building the tunnel 
and tolling the old one. Nevertheless, the net benefit from building the tunnel differs appreciably between 
tolling regimes, and it is sensitive to the value assumed for the marginal cost of public funds. 
 
Keywords: Infrastructure investment; Route choice; Congestion; Tolls. 
 
 
Introduction  
Urban traffic congestion is a serious and growing problem in many large cities around 
the world. The traditional response to congestion, building new roads, is now impeded 
or prevented by lack of space, high construction costs and long-lead times, 
environmental concerns and NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) opposition. Emphasis has 
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shifted since the 1980s towards demand-management approaches to controlling use of 
the car, and road pricing has slowly been gaining ground as demonstrated by successful 
urban road pricing schemes in Singapore, Norway, London, Melbourne, Hong Kong, 
North America and elsewhere. However, road pricing in urban areas is still obstructed 
by acceptability and other barriers that led to the rejection by referendum in February, 
2005, of a cordon scheme for Edinburgh. Most transport researchers now argue that a 
package approach of investment and demand-side measures has the best chance of 
meeting both traditional efficiency-based standards for policy appraisal and 
public/political acceptability hurdles. 
Given the large expenditures and potentially high political stakes in building new 
roads and designing tolling schemes, the need for careful cost-benefit and appraisal is 
obvious. This is all the more true for combined investment and tolling projects or 
schemes whose component parts need to be integrated into a consistent whole. For 
example, it is well known that the welfare gains from capacity investments depend on 
what pricing regime is in place (Small et al., 1989; Winston, 1991) and that building 
new infrastructure can have perverse effects (e.g. the Braess Paradox) if congestion and 
other transport externalities are not internalised.  
The purpose of this paper is to conduct an exploratory cost-benefit analysis of 
alternative tunnel investment cum tolling schemes in Antwerp, Belgium. Traffic in 
Antwerp is heavy on weekdays, and congestion is particularly severe on one of the 
tunnels that cross under the Scheldt river near the city centre. A proposal has been made 
to construct a new tunnel to alleviate congestion through the existing tunnel, and to 
offer a shorter route for some of the passenger and freight traffic. Tolls on the existing 
and new tunnels have also been suggested as a way to manage congestion as well as to 
pay for the construction and maintenance costs of the new tunnel. To assess the relative 
merits of these proposals, a recently-developed cost-benefit model is used to evaluate 
one toll-only and three investment cum tolling regimes, and to compare each scheme 
with a do-nothing/business-as-usual scenario. With the base-case parameter values and 
assumptions, constructing the new tunnel is found to be worthwhile for all three tolling 
regimes. Nevertheless, the net benefit from building the tunnel and the impacts on 
passenger and freight user groups vary appreciably across the tolling regimes. 
 
 
1. Tunnel construction and tolling options in Antwerp 
 
Antwerp straddles the Scheldt river as shown in Figure 1. Four tunnels cross the 
Scheldt in the general neighbourhood of the proposed new tunnel: two very small 
tunnels in the city centre (the St. Anna tunnel and the Waasland tunnel), the Kennedy 
tunnel to the south and the Liefkenshoek tunnel far north of the city. Several bridges 
also cross the Scheldt far to the south. Of these tunnels and bridges the two major 
crossings are the Kennedy tunnel and the Liefkenshoek tunnel. The Kennedy tunnel lies 
on the ring road R1 that circles the centre of Antwerp to the east of the Scheldt. The 
Kennedy tunnel conveys a daily two-way flow of about 122,000 vehicles. The 
Liefkenshoek tunnel lies far to the north of the city, and it carries a much smaller daily 
flow of about 11,000 vehicles. 
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A proposal has been made to build an additional tunnel under the Scheldt between the 
Kennedy and Liefkenshoek tunnels. The future tunnel1, known as the “Oosterweel” 
connection, would branch off the ring road R1 and offer a shorter route for traffic 
heading to or from the north of Antwerp. R1 is a crossroad for several motorways, and it 
is heavily used by cars and for national and international/transit freight transport. 
Building a new tunnel would alleviate traffic congestion through the Kennedy tunnel 
and on the ring road generally. 
The new tunnel is expected to cost about €1.2 billion. One option is to fund it 
publicly, and another is to solicit private financing with cost recovery through tolls. The 
Liefkenshoek tunnel is toll-financed, and offers a local precedent for private-sector 
involvement with road construction and operation. However, tolling is politically 
controversial and may be opposed by truckers and other interest groups. It is therefore 
of interest to compare several alternative investment cum tolling regimes. Five 
candidates are: (1) do nothing and continue with business as usual; (2) refrain from 
building the new tunnel, but toll the Kennedy tunnel to alleviate congestion in the tunnel 
and on the ring road; (3) build the new tunnel and let traffic use both tunnels toll-free; 
(4) have the new tunnel built by the private sector and toll it on a cost-recovery basis; 
and (5) build the new tunnel and toll both tunnels to support an optimal overall level and 
division of traffic between the tunnels.2 
Toll collection costs and potential cost savings from harnessing the private sector 
aside, the socially-optimal (i.e. social-surplus maximising) choice would be either 
Option 2 or Option 5 depending on whether or not a new tunnel is warranted. Option 4 
is feasible only if demand to use the new tunnel is sufficient to generate adequate toll 
revenues when the Kennedy tunnel offers a toll-free substitute. And, even if Option 4 is 
viable, an allocative efficiency loss will result if the break-even toll on the new tunnel 
exceeds the second-best optimal toll. 
Comparison of the various alternatives is complicated by the system of road 
administration in Belgium. Belgium is a federal country with three regions (Flanders, 
Wallonia and Brussels). The regions are responsible for road infrastructure, but the 
principal taxes on road use (the excise taxes on fuel) are federal. Decisions at the two 
levels of government are not perfectly coordinated, and current fuel excise taxes differ 
from optimal Pigouvian levels for internalising environmental and other traffic 
externalities. Because the proposed tunnel would add only one short link to the overall 
road network, it is unlikely that building the tunnel would trigger a change in fuel tax 
rates or other user charges. Thus, transport taxes other than for tolls on the two tunnels 
are treated as given in the study. 
From this discussion it should be clear that a model is required to analyse and 
compare the competing tunnel construction and tolling options. The model is described 
in the following section. 
 
                                                 
1 For brevity it is called a tunnel here, but it is actually a combination of a tunnel and a bridge. 
2 Several other regimes could be entertained. One is to compensate the private concessionaire in Option 4 
through shadow tolls; i.e. a payment per vehicle that is funded from the public purse rather than from real 
tolls on users. Another regime is a mixed oligopoly in which the new tunnel is tolled by the 
concessionaire (perhaps under toll cap or rate-of-return regulations rather than strict cost recovery) and 
the Kennedy tunnel is tolled by the public authority. These and other alternatives could be explored in 
future work. 
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Figure 1: The ring road of Antwerp. 
 
2. The model 
 
The model (referred to as “MOLINO”) was recently developed as part of the 
European-Union funded REVENUE project to assess transport pricing, investments and 
regulatory regimes with emphasis on the allocation of revenues from user charges. The 
model is used in the REVENUE project for a variety of case studies that involve several 
modes. Since the model has to be applicable to many diverse problems, it is kept rather 
abstract and general. The present model version still has limited capabilities (in 
particular, it is limited to competition between two alternatives) and this application is 
one of the first tests of the model. The application needs further elaboration with respect 
to data and sensitivity analysis. 
 
 
Structure of the MOLINO model 
 
The MOLINO model is a policy assessment model, not a forecasting model. It is 
calibrated to an exogenous transport baseline that can be developed with any transport 
forecasting model. The time horizon, which can be chosen by the user, typically covers 
10 to 50 years. MOLINO is a partial equilibrium model of the transport market: income 
levels of the private transport users, and production levels of the firms using freight 
services as input, are taken as given. The model includes separate modules for demand, 
supply, equilibrium, and the regulatory framework. In its present form the model 
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contains two transport modes (e.g. two parallel roads, a road and parallel railway, a 
railway and competing air link, etc.).  
The demand module for passenger transport features an aggregate nested CES utility 
function with three levels: choice between transport and consumption of a composite 
commodity, choice between peak and off-peak periods, and choice between the two 
transport alternatives. Elasticities of substitution at each level are parametrically given. 
Passengers can be segmented into classes that differ with respect to their travel 
preferences, incomes and costs of travel time. The demand module for freight transport 
is based on an aggregate CES cost function (production levels are given) and also 
features three levels. The first level encompasses choice between transport and other 
production inputs, and the second and third levels are the same as for passenger 
transport. Freight transport can be segmented into local and transit traffic. 
Transport users pay a generalised cost that contains several components: a resource 
cost (say fuel for a car), taxes levied by central and local governments (say fuel taxes 
and car taxes), a user fee (toll or rail fare) and a time cost. For a given infrastructure, 
travel time is assumed to be a linear function of traffic flows. 
For each transport alternative a distinction can be made between an operator who 
takes care of maintenance and can set tolls or user charges, and an infrastructure 
supplier who decides on capacity extensions and on infrastructure charges. The costs of 
the operator have a linear structure: a fixed cost, constant variable maintenance and 
operation costs that depend on the type of vehicle or load, and finally a payment for 
infrastructure use that can be specified in different ways. The infrastructure provider 
also has a linear cost structure where the main costs are the investment and associated 
financial costs for the infrastructure. Operator and infrastructure suppliers can be private 
or public agents, and the cost level can depend on the contractual form.  
The model includes a local and a central government that can pursue different 
objectives and control different tax and subsidy instruments including fuel taxes, public 
transport subsidies and profit taxes. Given the demand and cost functions, and the 
regulatory framework (see below) that specifies the behaviour of the governments, 
operators and infrastructure suppliers, the equilibrium module computes a fixed-point 
solution in terms of prices and levels of congestion for the two transport alternatives. In 
its present version the model has myopic expectations and is solved year by year.  
It is the exogenous regulatory framework that dictates the rules of the game and the 
ultimate outcome. This exogenous framework specifies for each alternative the 
objective functions of the governments, operators and infrastructure managers (public or 
private objectives), the nature of competition, procurement policies, the cost of capital, 
and the source and use of transport tax revenues. Various market structures can be 
modeled, including no tolls (free access), exogenous tolls, marginal social cost pricing, 
private duopoly and mixed oligopoly. Public decisions can be made either by local or 
central governments that may attach different welfare-distributional weights to agents 
(e.g. low-income vs. high-income passengers, or local vs. transit freight traffic) as well 
as different weights to air pollution and other (non-congestion) external transport costs. 
Primary outputs from MOLINO are equilibrium prices, transport volumes, travel times, 
cost efficiency of operations, toll revenues and financial balances, travellers’ surplus 
and social welfare. 
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Application of the model to the Antwerp tunnels 
The existing version of the model allows only two transport alternatives. Given the 
structure of the road network described in Section 1, these are selected as the Kennedy 
tunnel and the proposed Oosterweel connection. Henceforth they will be referred to 
respectively as the OLD tunnel and the NEW tunnel. The model therefore neglects the 
other tunnels and bridges, as well as the effects of changes in the transport flows 
through the two tunnels on other parts of the network. 3 The elasticity of substitution 
between the OLD and NEW tunnels is assumed to be finite because the model provides 
an aggregate behavioural representation of users with different origins/destinations and 
potential travel time savings from using the NEW tunnel (cf Figure 1). 
A time horizon of 20 years is chosen starting in 2000: the latest year for which 
calibration data are available. If the NEW tunnel is built, it is assumed to become 
available in 2010 and a salvage value for it is computed at the end of the horizon in 
2020. An annual social discount rate of 5% is used to compute present values.4 
 
User groups 
The model features two groups of passenger/car users and two groups of freight users. 
One group of car users is assumed to comprise commuters and travelers on business 
with high values of time; this type of traffic is referred to as work trips. The second 
group of car users have lower values of time and/or more flexibility in the timing of 
their trips, and are referred to as other users. Freight traffic is divided into transit traffic, 
and local traffic. For this preliminary case study the two freight groups are assumed to 
have the same behavioural parameters and are assigned the same weights in the welfare 
function. The two freight groups therefore fare identically in the various investment cum 
toll regimes. Freight vehicles have a Passenger Car Equivalent (PCE) of 2.0. Both 
passenger and freight traffic volumes are assumed to grow at 1% per annum, which is 
the growth rate commonly accepted for Belgian traffic. 
 
Infrastructure costs and operation 
The NEW tunnel is assumed to cost €1.2 billion to complete by Year 10. It is assumed 
to have a lifetime of 100 years, and with the 5% discount rate it has a salvage value of 
€751,055 at the end of Year 20. 
 
Externalities 
Every trip generates congestion externalities as well as air pollution, noise and 
accident externalities. (Values per vehicle-kilometre are specified in the Appendix.) In 
addition, freight vehicles create pavement damage of €0.27/vkm.5 
 
                                                 
3 Adding the small existing tunnels to the analysis would not change the traffic effects very much since 
these alternatives are already taken into account in the substitution patterns (demand functions) for the 
two tunnels considered. The welfare effects would change slightly if one of the other existing tunnels 
were tolled since the toll revenues derived from it would drop when a new tunnel is built. 
4 A five percent annual discount rate is used by the public sector in Belgium for cost benefit analysis. 
5 It could be argued that transit and local traffic should be treated separately since transit trucks tend to be 
heavier. Unfortunately, data limitations precluded a distinction. 
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Tolling costs and procedures 
Differentiating tolls by vehicle size is common on both conventional and electronic 
toll roads around the world. This is the practice on the Liefkenshoek tunnel, and it is 
assumed to be implemented on the OLD and NEW tunnels if they are tolled. However, 
there is no discrimination between automobile travellers on work trips and other trips6 
or between local and transit freight traffic. In the regimes with tolls, trucks are required 
to cover at least their pavement-damage related maintenance costs.7 In this application, 
the installation and operating costs of toll facilities are ignored8 and infrastructure 
management and toll operation are assumed to be vertically integrated. 
The remaining parameter values and data used to calibrate the model are presented in 
the Appendix. 
 
 
3. Simulation results 
 
This section reports the simulation results for the do-nothing and the four investment 
cum tolling regimes. For ease of reference the five regimes are listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Alternative investment cum tolling regimes. 
Regime Investment policy Tolling policy 
1 Business as Usual (BAU) No NEW tunnel built OLD tunnel remains toll-free 
2 NEW tunnel not built, 
tolling of OLD tunnel 
″ OLD tunnel is tolled to internalise 
congestion and other transport 
externalities from traffic using the 
OLD tunnel 
3 NEW tunnel built, no tolling NEW tunnel built by 
public sector 
Neither tunnel is tolled 
4 NEW tunnel built & tolled 
to recover costs 
NEW tunnel built by 
private sector  
NEW tunnel is tolled to recover its 
construction costs 
5 NEW tunnel built, both 
tunnels tolled 
NEW tunnel built by 
public sector  
Tolls are levied on both tunnels to 
internalise congestion and other 
transport externalities on the two-
link road network 
                                                 
6 Under first-best conditions the optimal congestion toll depends only on a vehicle’s contribution to 
congestion. Although motorists on work trips typically have higher values of time (and correspondingly 
lower sensitivity to tolls) than do motorists traveling for other reasons, the marginal external congestion 
costs they create are the same. In a second-best world, though, discriminatory pricing has a potential role 
to play in enhancing efficiency (Arnott and Kraus, 1998). Toll discounts for work trips have been 
endorsed on the grounds that work is discouraged by high employment taxes and other labour-market 
distortions. However, price discrimination of this sort is impeded by legal, practicality and acceptability 
barriers. Furthermore, labour-market and other distortions are largely ignored in the application of the 
MOLINO model undertaken here. 
7 EU legislation on heavy vehicle charges is still evolving. Nevertheless, the assumption that trucks are 
charged for their marginal maintenance costs is consistent with the currently accepted principle that tolls 
must be related to construction and maintenance costs and can vary by vehicle type. 
8 Operating costs of existing electronic systems generally run at about 10-20% of toll revenues (Small and 
Gómez-Ibáñez, 1998; Ramjerdi et al., 2004). London’s congestion pricing scheme is a notable exception 
with much higher operating costs because employees are required to aid motorists with some forms of 
payment and to read the license-plate images recorded by the Automatic Number Plate Recognition 
technology. 
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Regime 1: Business as Usual (BAU) 
In the Business as Usual (BAU) regime, no NEW tunnel is built and the OLD tunnel 
remains toll-free. The number of daily PCE trips through the OLD tunnel begins at 
about 117,000 in Year 1, and rises to nearly 128,000 in Year 20. This growth reflects 
the combined effect of an assumed 1% annual growth rate in traffic with congestion 
held constant, and a build-up in congestion that depends on tunnel capacity. Column 1 
of Table 2 reports the present-discounted daily benefits and costs from usage of the 
tunnel over the 20-year horizon at a 5% annual discount rate. Auto travel surplus and 
freight travel costs are recorded as a benchmark to compare with the welfare changes 
that result in the other four regimes. The regional government incurs the maintenance 
costs of the OLD tunnel, and both regional and national governments collect revenue 
from transport taxes. 
 
Table (2): Welfare gains and losses (present-value daily sums in euros over 20 year horizon, 5% discount 
rate). 
Regime 1 (BAU) 2 3 4 5 
 Welfare 
levels Welfare changes 
Construct NEW tunnel? No No Yes Yes Yes 
Tolling of tunnels None OLD, optimal None 
NEW, 
break even 
OLD+NEW, 
optimal 
Auto travellers' surplus      
   Work trips 24.728.541 -694.943 1.604.221 786.603 1.191.196 
   Other trips 12.131.229 -366.582 431.486 57.876 274.971 
Freight users' costs      
   Local traffic 30.328.753 -786.929 807.656 274.446 -16.169 
   Transit traffic 14.938.043 -387.592 397.801 135.175 -7.964 
External costs other 
than congestion 1.367.587 283.525 -163.238 22.407 67.458 
Toll revenues      
   OLD tunnel 0 2.559.706 0 0 1.519.475 
   NEW tunnel 0 0 0 1.035.077 388.803 
Tax revenues      
   Regional government 344.188 -67.027 41.192 -5.088 -6.438 
   Central government 1.809.742 -356.431 216.487 -27.262 -43.593 
Maintenance & 
construct. costs      
   OLD tunnel 1.091.096 283.077 344.651 147.780 541.523 
   NEW tunnel 0 0 -2.491.796 -2.141.006 -2.367.656 
Salvage value: NEW 
tunnel 0 0 751.055 751.055 751.055 
Welfare gain N/A 466.804 1.939.515 1.037.063 2.292.661 
Welfare gain relative to 
Regime 5 0 20% 85% 45% 100% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Positive entries correspond to welfare gains and negative entries to welfare losses. 
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Regime 2: NEW tunnel not built, tolling of OLD tunnel 
In Regime 2 the NEW tunnel is again not built, but a Pigouvian toll is levied on the 
OLD tunnel. To economise on calculation, optimal tolls are computed for two years: 
Year 1 and Year 10. The Year 1 toll is levied from Year 1 to Year 9, and the Year 10 
toll from Year 10 until the end of the horizon in Year 20.9 Optimal toll levels in the two 
intervals are reported in Table 3. As explained in Section 2, the same toll is levied on 
auto trips regardless of trip purpose and the same toll is applied on the two categories of 
freight traffic. Two features of the tolls in each interval may appear odd. First, the ratio 
of peak to off-peak tolls is much higher for autos than for trucks. Second, truck tolls are 
3-7 times larger than auto tolls although trucks have a PCE of 2, and therefore 
contribute only twice as much to congestion apiece as do autos. Both these oddities are 
due to the fact that trucks create substantial pavement damage costs that are not charged 
in the BAU regime, but are included in the tolls. 
Table 4 reports traffic volumes in Regime 2 for each user group for the peak period, 
the off-peak period and all trips as a percentage of volumes in Regime 1 (BAU). Total 
PCE traffic declines by about 20%. Auto volumes decline proportionally more for other 
trips than for work trips because values of travel time are much lower for other trips, 
and the benefits from congestion relief are correspondingly smaller. Freight volumes 
decline rather more than auto trips because of the much higher truck tolls. 
Column 2 of Table 2 reports the present-value changes in daily surpluses. Positive 
values indicate welfare gains, and negative values indicate welfare losses. Before 
accounting for the use of the toll revenues, all four user groups are worse off because 
the monetary values of the travel-time savings are more than offset by the tolls. The 
total losses are relatively evenly spread between passenger and freight traffic. External 
costs of traffic fall10 although the benefits are fairly small compared to users’ losses. 
Regional government is the big gainer since it receives the (sizeable) toll revenues that 
more than offset the increase in maintenance costs and the small loss of other tax 
revenues. The national government sees a modest reduction in fuel tax revenues.  
The overall present-value of the daily welfare gain from tolling the OLD tunnel 
amounts to €466,804. A welfare gain is inevitable given the assumptions that tolls are 
set optimally and tolling is costless.11 However, the gain is only 20% of the gain derived 
from Regime 5 discussed below (see the last row of Table 2). Moreover, all four user 
groups are left worse off, and their aggregate losses of nearly €2.24 million are nearly 
five times the welfare gain. Consequently, nearly 80% of the tax and toll revenues 
received by government would have to be, somehow, transferred to users in order to 
leave them no worse off than in the BAU regime. In principle, compensation could be 
effected either by rebating the toll revenues directly to users in a lump-sum fashion or 
by spending them in ways that benefit users.12 Constructing the NEW tunnel, as in 
                                                 
9 Optimal tolls are evaluated for only two of the 20 years in order to economise on computation time. 
There are no implacable institutional barriers in Belgium to prevent annual changes in tolls. However, 
depending on the toll-road enabling legislation, annual toll increases might have to be approved on an 
individual basis.  
10 The figure of $283,525 denotes the benefits from a reduction in the costs. 
11 Operating costs on existing toll facilities are actually considerable (up to 45% of revenues) but it is 
expected that developments in tolling technology would reduce these costs below 10% of the revenues. 
12 If revenues were distributed to motorists this would raise household incomes and boost passenger travel 
demand. This feedback effect whereby drivers “buy back road space” is typically ignored in modeling 
exercises although it could be accounted for with the MOLINO model. 
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Regimes 3-5, is one way to benefit users. However, none of Regimes 3-5 features a toll 
on the OLD tunnel to fund construction of the NEW tunnel. The cost recovery regime in 
Regime 4 entails tolling the NEW tunnel after it is built. 
 
Table (3): Toll levels (€/vehicle). 
Regime 2 4 5 
Construct 
NEW tunnel? No Yes Yes 
Tolling of 
tunnels OLD only,   optimal NEW only,   break even OLD and NEW,   optimal 
      
Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak Years 1-9 
OLD NEW OLD NEW OLD NEW OLD NEW 
Auto 1,8 0,7 1,8 0,7 
Freight 6,8 
 
5,0 
  
  
6,8 
  
5,0 
  
       
Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak Years 10-20 
OLD NEW OLD NEW OLD NEW OLD NEW OLD NEW OLD NEW 
Auto 2,2 0,9 3,5 3,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Freight 7,1 
  
5,2 
    
11,0 
  
11,0 4,8 4,7 4,1 4,1 
Note: No tolls are levied in Regimes 1 or 3. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table (4): Traffic volumes, Year 20 (BAU=100). 
Regime 2 3 4 5 
Construct NEW tunnel? No Yes Yes Yes 
Tolling of tunnels OLD, optimal None NEW, break even 
OLD+NEW, 
optimal 
Peak trips 
Work 85,3 149,6 107,0 150,3 Auto Other 60,8 124,3 95,5 124,5 
Freight 76,0 143,0 100,3 105,3 
Total 76,4 140,8 102,7 137,9 
Off-peak trips 
Work 90,0 134,7 98,3 135,3 Auto Other 81,2 114,5 90,6 114,6 
Freight 75,7 126,5 93,2 94,7 
Total 81,3 123,2 93,5 116,3 
All trips 
Work 87,5 143,0 103,1 143,6 Auto Other 74,8 117,5 92,1 117,7 
Freight 76,0 129,8 94,6 96,8 
Total 79,6 130,0 96,7 120,6 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Regime 3: NEW tunnel built, no tolling 
In Regime 3 the NEW tunnel is built, and both tunnels are kept toll-free. Since the 20-
year accounting time horizon begins in 2000 and no plan to build the tunnel has yet 
been made, it is assumed that the NEW tunnel goes into operation in Year 10. At the 
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end of the accounting period in Year 20, the NEW tunnel has a discounted salvage value 
of €751,055/day which is tallied in the accounting. 
Building the NEW tunnel greatly reduces congestion delays throughout the 
accounting period, and by Year 20 traffic volumes on the two tunnels combined are 
30% higher than in the BAU regime (cf Table 4). Because the NEW tunnel route is 
shorter than the OLD tunnel route for most users, the NEW tunnel captures over 80% of 
traffic from each user group in both the peak and off-peak periods (cf Table 5).13 
Despite the large cost of building the tunnel and the increase in external transport costs, 
the social surplus gain in Regime 3 is more than four times the gain from tolling the 
OLD tunnel in Regime 2 (cf Table 2) and amounts to 85% of the maximum gain derived 
in Regime 5. 
 
Table (5): Tunnel market shares, Year 20 (percentages). 
Regime 2 3 4 5 
Construct NEW tunnel? No Yes Yes Yes 
Tolling of tunnels OLD, optimal None NEW, break even OLD+NEW, optimal 
    OLD NEW OLD NEW OLD NEW OLD NEW 
Peak trips 
Work 100,0 0,0 17,6 82,4 41,3 58,7 17,7 82,3 Auto Other 100,0 0,0 17,7 82,3 80,1 19,9 17,7 82,3 
Freight 100,0 0,0 17,0 83,0 61,2 38,8 17,0 83,0 
Total 100,0 0,0 17,6 82,4 54,8 45,2 17,6 82,4 
Off-peak trips 
Work 100,0 0,0 17,7 82,3 50,8 49,2 17,7 82,3 Auto Other 100,0 0,0 17,7 82,3 82,5 17,5 17,7 82,3 
Freight 100,0 0,0 17,1 82,9 70,7 29,3 17,2 82,8 
Total 100,0 0,0 17,6 82,4 69,9 30,1 17,6 82,4 
All trips 
Work 100,0 0,0 17,7 82,3 45,3 54,7 17,7 82,3 Auto Other 100,0 0,0 17,7 82,3 81,7 18,3 17,7 82,3 
Freight 100,0 0,0 17,1 82,9 68,7 31,3 17,2 82,8 
Total 100,0 0,0 17,6 82,4 63,7 36,3 17,6 82,4 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
Regime 4: NEW tunnel built & tolled to recover costs 
In Regime 4 the NEW tunnel is built by private enterprise and brought into service in 
Year 10. But unlike in Regime 3, the NEW tunnel is tolled to cover the costs of 
maintaining it and to pay back the construction costs by the end of the accounting 
horizon in Year 20.14 Similar to Regime 2, it is assumed that there is no toll 
discrimination between either the two groups of auto users or the two categories of 
freight traffic. But unlike in Regime 2, peak and off-peak tolls are assumed to be the 
                                                 
13 The division of traffic between the tunnels is similar for all user groups because the elasticities of 
substitution are assumed to be the same (cf Table A1 in the Appendix). 
14 Since the tunnel commences operation only in Year 10, cost recovery (except for the salvage value) has 
to be accomplished within 10 years. Alternative recovery periods could be investigated by varying the 
accounting time horizon.  
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same.15 Consequently, only two tolls are levied: an auto toll of €3.50 and a truck toll of 
€11.00 (cf Table 3). These relatively high tolls depress traffic even below the levels 
reached in the BAU regime16, and the NEW tunnel captures a much smaller share since 
the OLD tunnel is left untolled. Passengers on work trips favour the NEW tunnel 
because the value of the travel time savings exceeds the toll. But majorities of the other 
user groups continue to use the OLD tunnel. 
Although it turns out to be feasible to finance the tunnel by charging users, the tolls 
far exceed the external costs of autos and trucks and the auto toll adds to the distortion 
created by the pre-existing taxes. As a consequence, the welfare gain in Regime 4 is 
little more than half the gain from building the NEW tunnel without tolls (Regime 3). 
 
Regime 5: NEW tunnel built, both tunnels tolled 
In the final regime the NEW tunnel is built in Year 10 and both tunnels are tolled 
optimally. During Years 1-9 before the tunnel is built, tolls on the OLD tunnel are the 
same as in Regime 2 (cf Table 3). The auto toll drops to zero when the NEW tunnel 
begins operation because fuel and other user taxes exceed the combined congestion and 
other external costs of auto trips. Trucks are still tolled to cover maintenance costs and 
the small remaining congestion externality, but the toll is lower than in Years 1-9 and 
much lower than the truck tolls in Regimes 2 and 4. 
Regime 5 turns out to be the most efficient of the five regimes (cf Table 2) and 
therefore achieves 100% efficiency. Auto drivers fare less well than without tolling 
(Regime 3) but better than with the break-even toll (Regime 4). Truckers do less well 
than in either Regime 3 or 4 because truck tolls are levied on all capacity throughout the 
accounting period. But reductions in external costs, and savings in maintenance costs, 
are higher than in either of these other regimes. 
 
                                                 
15 An alternative would be to assume that separate peak and off-peak tolls are set for autos and for trucks 
according to Ramsey pricing rules. There has been surprisingly little published research on temporal price 
discrimination by private toll road operators, and it is not obvious whether the peak/off-peak differential 
would be larger or smaller for a private operator than a public operator. Because private operators 
exercise market power by including a toll markup, congestion tends to be lower in the peak period – 
which suggests that the temporal differential will be proportionally smaller than on a public road. 
However, the elasticity of demand also varies by time of day, and this provides another incentive for a 
private operator (but not a public operator) to engage in intertemporal price discrimination. One bit of 
empirical evidence comes from Highway 407: a limited-access electronically-tolled highway in Toronto. 
In 1998 when the highway was publicly operated, separate peak, off-peak and night time/weekend tolls 
were levied with a ratio of 10:7:4 for each vehicle category. The highway was privatised in 1999, and 
since 2002 the maximum temporal toll differential has ranged from nothing to about 7%. While this 
suggests that temporal toll discrimination is less pronounced on private toll roads, there are at least two 
confounding factors. First, traffic volumes have grown very rapidly on Highway 407 since it went into 
operation in 1997, and second, tolls are subject to complicated regulations based on traffic volumes. 
16 Since the NEW tunnel provides a new option for drivers while the OLD tunnel remains as before, one 
might expect traffic levels in Regime 4 to remain above BAU even with very high tolls. The reason that 
traffic drops slightly is that the two tunnels are imperfect substitutes in the model. Introducing the NEW 
tunnel induces some users with strong preferences for the NEW tunnel to discontinue using the OLD 
tunnel, and to economise on their total amount of travel. This effect would weaken as the elasticity of 
substitution between tunnels (currently set at 5) is increased, and in the limit of perfect substitution the 
number of vehicle-kilometres would necessarily increase. 
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Sensitivity analysis 
The simulations described above incorporate assumptions about a large number of 
parameter values that affect both the absolute and relative welfare gains and losses in 
the four investment cum tolling regimes. Both computation time and page constraints 
preclude an exhaustive sensitivity analysis, and attention in this subsection is restricted 
to two parameters of obvious significance: the cost of constructing the NEW tunnel, and 
the marginal cost of public funds. 
 
Construction costs and private contracting 
 
The €1.2 billion construction cost for the NEW tunnel is a conservative figure based 
on the premise that the tunnel is built according to best practice with no delays or cost 
increases due to technological, incentive or other contractual problems. Yet worldwide 
experience with major transport infrastructure projects indicates that substantial cost 
overruns are quite common (Flyvberg et al., 2003) and that construction costs depend 
strongly on the contractual framework. We therefore tested the case where construction 
costs of the tunnel would increase by 20% when it is not built and operated by the 
private sector17. This means that in Cases 3 and 5, construction costs are increased by 
20%, but not in Case 4 where operation and investment are private. 
With the cost increases, the present-value welfare gains decrease by roughly 
€300,000-350,000 per day in Regimes 3 and 5 (cf panel (2) of Table 6). But the ranking 
of the four regimes is unchanged, and constructing the tunnel remains a viable 
proposition.  
 
Table 6: Welfare gains sensitivity analysis (present-value daily sums in euros over 20 year horizon, 5% 
discount rate). 
Regime 1 (BAU) 2 3 4 5 
Construct NEW tunnel? No No Yes Yes Yes 
Tolling of tunnels None OLD, 
optimal 
None NEW, 
break even 
OLD+NEW, 
optimal 
  (1) Base case 
Welfare gain N/A 466.804 1.939.515 1.037.063 2.292.661 
Welfare gain relative to 
Regime 5 
0% 20% 85% 45% 100% 
  (2) Construction costs, maint. costs & salvage value of NEW tunnel 
rise 20% for Cases 3&5 
Welfare gain N/A 466.804 1.591.367 1.037.063 1.971.823 
Welfare gain relative to 
Regime 5 
0% 24% 81% 53% 100% 
  (3) Marginal cost of public funds = 1.5 
Welfare gain N/A 2.300.043 994.783 1.051.452 2.945.536 
Welfare gain relative to 
Regime 5 
0% 78% 34% 36% 100% 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
                                                 
17 Private operation is not a guarantee against cost overruns. It is the nature and the power of the contract 
that are decisive. 
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Marginal cost of public funds 
 
Estimates of the marginal cost of public funds vary widely by jurisdiction and country 
(Kleven and Kreiner, 2003) and they are sensitive to how revenues are collected and 
spent. To assess the sensitivity of the welfare results to the premium on public funds, a 
value of 1.5 for the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF) was used in place of the base-
case value of 1. Doing so raises the effective costs of constructing and maintaining the 
tunnel, but it also raises the salvage value of the tunnel as well as the value attached to 
toll and tax revenues.  
Raising the MCPF has a more pronounced effect on the results than does the increase 
in construction costs (cf panel (3) of Table 6). The welfare gain from tolling the OLD 
tunnel without building the NEW tunnel (Regime 2) increases nearly five-fold relative 
to the base case. By contrast, building the NEW tunnel without introducing any tolls 
(Regime 3) drops by nearly 50% in benefits. Not surprisingly, building the tunnel under 
a break-even constraint (Regime 4) yields nearly the same welfare gain as in the base 
case because the premium attached to the toll revenue offsets the excess burden from 
the construction and maintenance costs. Finally, the welfare gain from the social 
optimum (Regime 5) rises moderately because the net increase in toll and tax revenues 
exceeds the construction and maintenance costs of the tunnels net of the salvage value 
of the NEW tunnel. 
As a consequence of these changes, the relative welfare gain from Regime 2 increases 
from 20% to 78% and boosts it from fourth (last) place to second place in the rankings 
of Regimes 2-5, while Regime 3 drops from 85% to 34% in efficiency, and from second 
place to last. Naturally, these results would change with alternative values for the 
MCPF, but they do illustrate the importance of accounting for the public finance side of 
infrastructure projects in the real world of second best. 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper has conducted a preliminary cost-benefit analysis of a proposed tunnel 
under the Scheldt river in Antwerp, Belgium. The analysis was performed using the 
MOLINO model: a cost-benefit tool for transport pricing, investment and regulation 
schemes that was recently developed as part of the European-Union funded REVENUE 
project. The model features a CES structure in which passengers and freight shippers 
make nested choices. For the Antwerp tunnel case study, three choice levels were 
implemented: (1) whether to travel, (2) to travel during the peak or off-peak period, and 
(3) to travel on one of two alternative links or routes. 
MOLINO was implemented in the case-study area by treating the proposed “NEW” 
tunnel as one alternative and an existing “OLD” tunnel as the other. Four alternative 
investment cum tolling regimes were considered that differ according to whether the 
NEW tunnel is built, and whether tolls are introduced on the NEW and/or the OLD 
tunnels. With the base-case parameter values, building the tunnel is worthwhile in all 
three tolling regimes and yields a higher benefit than not building the tunnel and tolling 
the OLD one. Nevertheless, the net benefit from building the tunnel varies appreciably 
between tolling regimes. Tolling both OLD and NEW tunnels results in the highest 
benefits since tolling costs are ignored and tolling both tunnels supports an optimal level 
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and division of traffic between them. Building the tunnel without introducing any tolls 
compares relatively favourably since the new tunnel adds sufficient capacity to reduce 
congestion on the two-link network to a comparatively low level. By comparison, 
implementing a break-even toll on the NEW tunnel is far less efficient because it 
suppresses traffic through the NEW tunnel well below the optimal level and induces too 
much traffic to take the OLD tunnel. 
Raising the construction and maintenance costs of the NEW tunnel by 20% in the two 
regimes with public operation does not affect the rankings of the regimes or other 
qualitative results. By contrast, setting the marginal cost of public funds at 1.5 pushes 
the two investment regimes with imperfect tolling down in the rankings, and raises the 
regime with no investment and optimal tolling of the OLD tunnel up to second place. 
While the results of the case study provide some interesting insights, the analysis is 
preliminary and should be taken further in at least four respects. One is to extend the 
sensitivity analysis to include such elements as the elasticity of substitution for 
passenger and freight traffic between alternatives, the costs of installing and operating 
the tolling infrastructure, and more procurement issues related to the costs of public vs. 
private construction and how privately operated toll roads and tunnels should be 
regulated. The ramifications of reforming the existing system of transport taxes could 
also be explored. A second extension is to refine the analysis of the alternative 
investment cum tolling regimes by extending the time horizon beyond 20 years, 
optimising tolls in every year, and computing Ramsey-optimal tolls by jointly 
optimising peak and off-peak tolls for passenger and freight traffic. A third extension is 
to consider the other tunnels that cross the Scheldt river as a third alternative and to take 
into account the benefits or costs on the rest of the network. Finally one can study in 
more detail the decision making (investment and tolling the two tunnels) of the regional 
government when it weighs the benefits to transit users and to national government tax 
revenues differently. 
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6. Appendix 
This appendix describes the primary data used to calibrate the MOLINO model and to 
run the simulations. The model was calibrated using two sets of data: first a set of 
simulation results of a transport model with the NEW tunnel, and second the present 
equilibrium without the NEW tunnel. In the simulation with NEW tunnel, 80% of the 
travellers are expected to choose to cross the river using the NEW tunnel. Traffic on the 
OLD tunnel will be significantly reduced so that during the peak period the average 
speed is expected to be 100 km/h for both the OLD and NEW tunnel. During the off-
peak period the average speed will be close to the free-flow speed. The parameters of 
the utility and cost functions were chosen to fit this simulation and at the same time also 
fit the present equilibrium by assuming that at present the tolls on the NEW tunnel are 
infinite.  
 
Traffic volume data used for calibration 
Table A1 records forecasted traffic volumes if a NEW tunnel is built and no tolls are 
levied. In this case 80% of the travellers are expected to choose to cross the river using 
the NEW tunnel. Total demand will rise from 120,000 vehicles per day to nearly 
150,000. Nearly half (47%) of passenger trips are made during the peak period, with 
70% of these trips taken for business or commuting purposes. During the off-peak more 
passenger trips are taken for other purposes than work. By contrast, only 22% of freight 
trips are made during the peak and local firms account for 67% of trips in both the peak 
and off-peak. 
Table A1: Traffic volumes in base case. 
Trip type Peak Off-peak Category 
 NEW OLD NEW OLD 
Total 
Peak 
Total  
Off-
Peak 
Share 
all trips 
Work 33,259 7,191 23,842 5,155 40,450 31,033 56.5% 
Other 14,254 3,082 29,736 6,429 17,336 32,818 43.5% Passengers 
Share pass. trips     47.0% 53.0%  
Local  3,232 669 11,460 2,373 3,901 12,129 67.0% 
Transit  1,592 330 5,644 1,169 1,922 5,974 33.0% Freight 
Share freight trips     22.0% 78.0%  
Source: expert judgment on basis of Federal Department of Transport data (2001). 
 
Parameters of utility functions 
Passenger transport is described by a three-level decision tree with the following 
nested choices: 
1. to cross the river or spend income on other goods 
2. to cross the river in the peak or in the off-peak period 
3. to take the OLD tunnel or the NEW tunnel 
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For freight transport the top-level choice is between transporting goods across the 
river and delivering the product or service to consumers using other inputs. The other 
two choice levels are the same as for passenger transport. Table A2 lists the elasticities 
of substitution at each choice level for passenger and freight transport.  
Table A2: Elasticities of substitution. 
Category Trip type Transport & 
other goods 
Peak & off-
peak 
OLD & NEW 
during peak 
OLD & NEW 
during off-peak 
Work 1.2 0.8 5 5 
Passengers Other 1.2 1.5 5 5 
Local  1.2 0.9 5 5 
Freight Transit  1.2 0.9 5 5 
Source: De Borger and Proost (2001).  
 
Travel time-flow 
The travel time-flow function for each tunnel is assumed to be linear in traffic flow. 
To calibrate the function for the OLD tunnel, current speed and traffic flow counts on 
the ring road were used. The function for the NEW tunnel was calibrated using the 
forecasted results.  
 
Speed data  
The average distance traveled on the ring road for vehicles using the OLD (Kennedy) 
tunnel or NEW tunnel is 14 km. Average speed is assumed to be 60 km/h in peak, and 
85 km/h during the off peak. If the NEW tunnel is built, average speed during the peak 
is expected to be 100 km/h for both the OLD and NEW tunnel routes and off-peak 
speeds are expected to be close to free-flow speeds (120 km/h). 
 
Value of time 
Values of travel time are reported in Table A3; they are assumed to be the same 
during the peak and the off-peak. 
Table A3: Values of time (€/h). 
Category Trip type Value of time 
Work 21.6 
Passengers Other   4.3 
Local  46.2 
Freight Transit  46.2 
Source: UNITE (Nelthrop e.a., 2001). 
 
Infrastructure costs and external costs of traffic 
The cost of building the NEW tunnel (“Oosterweel” connection) is estimated to be 
€1.2 billion (http://www.werkenantwerpen.be/BAM/corporate.aspx). To calculate the 
salvage value of capacity in 2020 we used a simple annuity technique in which the 
present value in 2020 is equal to the discounted sum of a constant annuity for the 
remaining years of the technical lifetime. 
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Variable operating, maintenance and external costs of the NEW tunnel are listed in 
Table A4. 
Table A4: Operator and infrastructure manager costs & external costs. 
Source: External costs: G. De Ceuster, (2004),. Maintenance costs: ECMT (2003). 
 
Users costs and existing taxes 
Table A5 reports the resource costs (fuel, vehicle depreciation and insurance costs) 
and tax costs incurred by users per vehicle kilometre. 
Table A5: Monetary costs borne by users. 
Passenger vehicles Freight vehicles  
Work Other Local Transit 
NEW 0.134 0.134 0.285 0.285 
Resource cost [€/vkm] OLD 0.134 0.134 0.285 0.285 
NEW 0.073 0.073 0.107 0.107 
National tax [€/vkm] OLD 0.073 0.073 0.107 0.107 
NEW 0.014 0.014 0.018 0.018 
Regional tax [€/vkm] 
OLD 0.014 0.014 0.018 0.018 
Source: G. De Ceuster (2003). 
 
 
Other parameters 
The marginal cost of public funds is set equal to 1 so that no premium is attached in 
the welfare calculations to revenues collected by government from tolls and other user 
charges. In Regime 4, where the NEW tunnel is operated and managed by a private 
operator, the national government taxes profits at a rate of 35%. Profits are assumed to 
be allocated to the various user groups in proportion to the numbers of trips taken. 
To calibrate the nested CES functions, the share of household income devoted to 
passenger transport was set at 20%, and the share of transport expenditures in total 
production costs was set at 10%. 
Peak Off-peak  
NEW  OLD  NEW OLD 
Pass. veh 0 0 0 0 
Variable operating cost [€/veh] Freight veh 0 0 0 0 
Pass. veh 0 0 0 0 
Variable infrastructure charge [€/veh] Freight veh 0 0 0 0 
Pass. veh 0 0 0 0 
Maintenance [€/veh] Freight veh 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 
Pass. veh 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 
External cost [€/vkm] 
Freight veh 0.124 0.124 0.124 0.124 
